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1 Introduction
The ratio of wage bill to value-added is not constant over time and space. In continental European
countries, the labor share (LS) increased in the 1970s, peaked in the early 1980s, and then dramatically felt
in the 1980s-1990s. The decline reaches 10 points in France, which creates endless debates about workers
fair share of income. By contrast, the share is very stable in the UK, US, and Canada. Accordingly,
political interests in the LS are nonexistent. These diverging patterns of the LS take place in a particular
era characterized by product market globalization, and especially trade with developing countries. The
research question we address in this paper is whether the HOS model, once completed by a wage rigidity
in a sub-group of countries, can account for such changes in LS in OECD countries.
Changes in LS are not easy to reconcile with perfect competition and technological homogeneity. The
classical view of the LS highlights the role of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor.
From this perspective, LS movements result from the impacts of capital deepness and technological
change. Cobb-Douglas technologies feature a unitary elasticity of substitution. The LS is constant as
a result (see e.g. Kaldor, 1955, Solow, 1958, and Kravis, 1959). Constant Elasticity of Substitution
technologies can explain why the labor share varies with capital intensity. But the predicted relationship
between the labor share and capital intensity is monotonic, which is not compatible with the set of facts
reported above. Since Blanchard (1997), several papers considered the role of technological change (see
e.g. Hornstein et al, 2002, Acemoglu, 2003, Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003, Guscina, 2006, and Ellis
and Smith, 2007). Firms may have adopted labor-saving technologies as an answer to the supply shock
of the 1970s. The elasticity of substitution between capital and labor would have increased as a result.
The main shortcoming of this approach is that, according to Nordhaus (1997), it seems unrealistic that
production techniques used in continental European countries remain unknown in the Anglo-Saxon world.
A number of contributions depart from the perfect competition paradigm. Checchi and Garcia-
Peñalosa (2007) show that in a closed economy where wages are collectively bargained, unemployment
benets, minimum wage or union bargaining power increase the labor share. Blanchard (1997) and Blan-
chard and Giavazzi (2003) highlight the interaction between product and labor market imperfections. A
decrease in European labor shares may be due to (i) an increase in the mark-up of price over marginal
costs, or (ii) a decrease in workersbargaining power due to labor market reforms. However, a mark-
up increase is not really plausible given that the 1980s and the 1990s are characterized by European
integration, globalization and product market deregulation. Meanwhile, reforms have been more timid
and piecemeal on the labor market (Boeri et al, 2000). In France for instance, the early 1980s saw the
introduction of stricter regulations rather than softer ones.
In this paper, we point out the role of trade and wage rigidities, or, more precisely, the fact that the
trade impact on the labor share di¤ers according to whether the country is characterized by wage rigidity
or not. Section 2 describes the aggregate patterns of labor shares in OECD countries. It also discusses
the microeconomic evidence, which suggests that aggregate changes are driven by factor reallocation
across sectors with heterogenous and stable labor shares. Then, we consider the Davis (1998) model.
In standard HOS theory, markets are perfectly competitive and factor prices are determined by factor
endowments at the world level. The relative scarcity of capital with respect to labor determines the
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relative price of the capital-intensive good. In turn, such a relative price determines the relative factor
price by Stolper-Samuelson theorem. In Davis, a subset of countries participating in international trade
set a wage rigidity that is not compatible with full employment. The wage rigidity does not alter the
Stolper-Samuelson relationship, and the relative price of the capital-intensive good goes up. This must
be true at the world level, leading to factor price equalization throughout the world. The employment
cost of the rigidity is magnied.
We use the Davis model to predict the impact of trade openness and wage rigidities on the labor
shares of income. We model the wage rigidity in a convenient form: we assume that the relative price of
labor with respect to capital is exogenously given. This allows us to write the model outputs as simple
functions of the relative wage rigidity. Our arguments hinge on the following idea. In the country that
implements the relative wage rigidity, globalization induces factor reallocation towards capital-intensive
and low-labor share sectors. Globalization, therefore, increases the aggregate elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor, or, equivalently, reduces the aggregate elasticity of labor demand with respect
to relative factor cost. In the free-wage country, globalization does not alter factor allocation across
sectors. Sector weights in aggregate value-added do not change, and the aggregate labor share stays
constant. We focus on two implications.
First, increasing the rigid wage is more likely to decrease the labor share in a globalized world than in
a closed economy. For instance, the labor share stays constant in a closed economy when sector-specic
technologies are Cobb-Douglas and the utility function is log-linear. By contrast, and under the same
technological assumptions, the labor share falls when the economy is open to international trade. A
decline in European labor shares does not require any product market imperfections and involves more
rigid wages rather than less rigid wages. It also means that European workers not only pay a huge price
in terms of foregone jobs, but they also su¤er from low relative earnings prospects.
Second, we follow Davis and consider the implications of free trade between three economic zones:
Europe, the US and Newly Industrialized Countries. The European wage rigidity is set at the competitive
level that prevails in autarky. Trade openness leads to a strong decrease in European LS, while keeping
the US share constant. Meanwhile, such changes at the aggregate level are compatible with stable labor
shares at the rm/sector level.
Then, we turn to empirical implications. Our purpose is not to provide an n-th test of HOS theory.
Rather, we assume that HOS theory broadly works to describe the patterns of trade1 , and we examine
whether trade-induced factor reallocation can explain a substantial part of observed changes in labor
shares across Continental Europe and the Anglo-Saxon countries. We use the KLEMS dataset, which
provides sectorial data for 8 OECD countries over the period 1970-2005. To closely mimic the model,
we build two super sectors. The capital-intensive sector is composed of sectors whose capital intensity
is larger than the aggregate capital intensity in 1980. The labor-intensive sector is composed of the
remaining sectors. The magnitude of trade with developing countries is captured by bilateral trade
openness with China. The choice of this variable follows Michaels et al (2009) who argue that trade with
China is a good proxy for the whole of trade with developing countries.
1One of the most serious critiques of the HOS model is that rm-level data do not support endowment-driven special-
ization across products. However, Schott (2003) argues that such specialization occurs within products.
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Trade with China grew in all countries. It starts from 0 in the early 1970s and reaches between 1.5%
and 3.5% in the 2000s. Meanwhile, the share of the capital-intensive super-sector experienced a 6-point
increase in Continental European countries, while it did not change or even declined by 6 points in the UK
and the US. Trade and capital-intensive sector shares seem, therefore, positively correlated in rigid-wage
countries, and negatively or uncorrelated in free-wage countries. These opposite phenomena are in line
with the model discussed above.
We then regress the share of the capital-intensive super-sector on trade with China. Trade with
China is also interacted with a dummy variable taking the value one if the country is from continental
Europe, and 0 otherwise. All regressions feature country xed e¤ects, time e¤ects, and the aggregate
ratio of capital stock to GDP to account for Rybczinski e¤ects. IV estimates imply that trade with
China explains half the observed di¤erential capital-intensive sector share change (against 100% for OLS
estimates). The corresponding di¤erential impact on the labor share is about 1 point (2 points), a third
(two thirds) of the observed e¤ect.
Recent literature deals with the impact of globalization on the LS. A rst strand of literature considers
the basic implications of the HOS model without wage rigidity. Following trade openness between labor-
and capital-abundant countries, the wage share should go down in capital-abundant countries and up in
labor-abundant countries. This theory fails to explain the variety of patterns that the di¤erent groups of
OECD countries experience. A second strand of the literature was initiated by Rodrik (1997) who argues
that openness hurts workersbargaining power and makes wages decreasing at given output. Going from
a decline in wage to a decline in LS is not so simple: as far as labor is paid its marginal product, changes
in wages do not tell much about changes in the LS. Models typically assume that there are rents on
the product market created by imperfect competition, and workers and rmsowners bargain over total
surplus, including rents. Any increase in rmsstatu-quo position reduces the share of rents accruing to
labor, thereby deteriorating the LS. Harrison (2002), for nancial openness, and Ortega and Rodriguez
(2002), for international trade, develop models along these lines. Rodrik-type arguments imply that
the labor share should decrease both at the aggregate level and within rms or sectors. The empirical
evidence suggests that it may not be the case, at least in OECD countries. Furthermore, and as the
rst strand of literature, those theories cannot predict the observed heterogeneity at the country level in
the patterns of aggregate labor shares. Decreuse and Maarek (2009) develop a model in which foreign
direct investment has negative and then positive impacts on the LS in DCs. Their paper does not involve
international trade, and only concerns DCs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the main stylized facts, while Section
3 presents the theoretical results. Section 4 discusses how the theory can explain the facts and extends
the basic model to capital-skill complementarity. Section 5 concludes.
2 Stylized facts
In this section, we present the set of facts that we want to explain. Such facts concern overall changes in
the labor shares in developed countries, the negative correlation between the LS and the unemployment
rate, and the small changes observed at disaggregate level.
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We distinguish developed countries according to the degree of wage rigidity. However, measures of the
degree of wage rigidity are endogenous and may respond to changes in the labor share. In addition, we
need a broad measure that allows us to sort countries into two groups, rather than a continuous measure
that makes a precise distinction between countries. Botero et al (2004) show that the degree of labor
market regulation is strongly determined by the legal origins of the judicial system. They classify ve
di¤erent legal origins: English, French, German, Scandinavian, and Socialist. They argue that countries
with common law legal systems (English law) regulate their labor market much less than countries with
civil law legal systems (other laws). Legal origins are predetermined, which o¤ers a simple way to deal
with potential endogeneity problems.
We distinguish two sets of countries. Civil-law countries correspond to Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain, whereas common-law countries correspond to the US, Canada, and
the UK. This distinction broadly maps the more usual distinction between continental European and
Anglo-Saxon countries.
The labor share is computed as the ratio of total employee compensation over value added calculated
at market price. Labor shares must be corrected to account for self-employment.2 Individual labor shares
are reported in the Appendix. We compute the aggregate labor share for both zones as a weighted average
of country-specic labor shares (GDP shares are used as weights).
Figure 1 reports the patterns of the labor shares in Anglo-Saxon and continental European coun-
tries.The labor share amounts to 64.5% for Anglo-Saxon countries and 65% for European countries in
1970, which corresponds to the standard calibrated value. Continental European countries experience an
increase in the labor share starting from the early 1970s, and then a sharp decrease starting from the
early 1980s. The decrease overshoots the increase of the 1970s and the labor share is lower in 2000 than
in 1970, 59.5% against 65%. The Anglo-Saxon labor share is more stable: it decreases from 64.5% to
62.5%.3 The di¤erential change, therefore, is -3.5 labor share points against Continental Europe.
Overall changes in European labor shares broadly mirror changes in unemployment rates. European
unemployment massively increased during the 1980s, and stayed high afterwards. By contrast, Anglo-
Saxon unemployment rates did not change much. To quote Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), for the major
Continental European countries, Germany, France, Italy and Spain, "the major decline in the share in
the 1980s coincided with a further increase in the unemployment rate during that decade".
We regress the labor share on the unemployment rate. Table 1 reports the estimates for our sample
of countries. The coe¢ cient is negative and statistically signicant in Continental European countries,
while it is positive or negative in Anglo-Saxon countries.
2The self-employed contribute to value-added but do not receive any wage. We use the standard assumption that the
wage of self-employed workers corresponds to the mean wage of employees (see also Gollin, 2002).
3This trend disappears when we consider unadjusted labor shares.
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Figure 1: Labor shares in Anglo-Saxon and continental European countries, 1971-2004. Source: aggregate
OECD data corrected for self-employment. Anglo-Saxon countries: Canada, UK, US. European countries:
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Spain. See the Appendix for details.
Legal origin Estimated coe¢ cient
Canada Common law 0:40
(0:10)
Finland Civil law (Nordic)  0:72
(0:15)
France Civil law  0:69
(0:17)
Germany Civil law (German)  0:49
(0:08)
Italy Civil law  1:01
(0:19)
Netherlands Civil law  0:65
(0:27)
Spain Civil law  0:35+
(0:21)
UK Common law  0:29
(0:11)
US Common law 0:29
(0:15)
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. The
Table reports the estimated coe¢ cient of unemployment while
regressing the labor share on unemployment and a constant.
Squared errors between brackets.
Table 1: Unemployment and the labor share, 1970-2000
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Table 2 emphasizes the divide between the two subsets of countries. We proceed to xed-e¤ects
regressions. We estimate a single coe¢ cient for the whole sample and for each subsample of countries.
The results show that the coe¢ cient is generally negative, and much larger for European countries than
for Anglo-Saxon countries. The idea we put forward in this paper is that such a correlation between the
labor share and the unemployment rate reects the impact of an X factor that jointly determines the
labor shares and corresponding unemployment rates. This X factor is trade globalization, and mostly
trade with labor-abundant economies.
Legal origin Estimated coe¢ cient
Common law  0:04
(0:09)
Civil law  0:68
(0:07)

Overall  0:55
(0:05)
*** signicant at 1%. The Table reports the
coe¢ cient of unemployment from xed e¤ects
regressions. Squared errors between brackets.
Table 2: Unemployment and the labor share, xed-e¤ects regressions
Several studies focus on labor shares at disaggregate level. They tend to show that the labor share is
stable at micro level, which contrasts with the patterns of aggregate shares. Aggregate labor share can
be written as
LSt =
nX
i=1
itLSit (1)
where i stands for sector, rms, or plant, t for the year and it = PiYit=PtYt for relative output in sector
i. Labor share variation can be decomposed into two terms:
LSt =
nX
i=1
LSitit 1 +
nX
i=1
itLSit (2)
Aggregate variation comes from within-sector (or rm) variation, and from between-sector factor reallo-
cation. Kyyra and Maliranta (2008) show that all the decreases observed in Finland from 1970 to 2000
are due to factor reallocation between existing rms or plants. Böckerman and Maliranta (2009) show
that trade is the main factor behind such factor reallocation. Bush et al (2008) focus on regional data for
Italy (20 regions) and Germany (16 regions) and nd only weak evidence in favor of a negative impact
of trade on region-specic labor shares. The decrease in aggregate labor share must be due to factor
reallocation across regions with di¤erent capital intensities and specialization patterns. De Serres et al
(2002) decompose variations in the labor share at industry level between 7 industries. From 1970 to 2000,
sector reallocation implies a 7-point decrease in aggregate labor share in Germany, 4 points in France, 3
points in Italy, and 4 points in the Netherlands.
In Section 4, we complete these ndings. We examine sectorial data and show that capital-intensive
sectors grew in Continental Europe, while they declined in the US and the UK. We also argue that the
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di¤erential pattern of factor reallocation between the two sets of countries is partly due to trade with
developing countries. Before we present our methodology and results, we turn to theoretical developments.
3 HOS, labor shares, and wage rigidities
In this section, we confront the HOS model with wage rigidity to the set of facts reported in Section 2.
We rst derive well-known results concerning the impact of factor accumulation and changes in relative
factor costs on the labor share. Second, we briey recall Davis (1998) model with wage rigidity. Third,
we discuss the e¤ects of trade and wage rigidity on the labor shares. Fourth, we distinguish sector-specic
e¤ects from composition e¤ects across sectors induced by factor reallocation. Finally, we examine how
trade openness with labor-abundant countries can explain the patterns of labor shares in Continental
Europe and in Anglo-Saxon countries.
3.1 A reminder
Assume that there are two production factors, K and L; paid at marginal product and used in a constant
returns to scale technology. The Euler theorem implies that output is totally dispatched between capital
and labor returns so that the labor share is
LS =
wL
wL+ rK
=
!
! + k
; (3)
where w is the wage, r is the unit capital cost, ! = w=r is the relative wage, and k = K=L is capital
intensity. Changes in LS result from changes in k and !. However, these variables are generally linked
to each other.
We start with the case where the dependence is nil, which we name the trade view of the labor share.
Result 1 Trade view of the labor share
Let ! be given. Then, the labor share strictly decreases with capital intensity, that is @LSi=@ki < 0.
Capital deepness lowers the labor share. This property has two implications. Suppose rst that !
is the same across sectors. Then Result 1 means that capital-intensive sectors feature a lower labor
share than labor-intensive sectors. Now, consider a set of countries forming a trade area. The Factor
Price Equalization theorem states that ! must be the same across countries. According to Result 1,
country-specic labor share should decrease with capital intensity.
More generally, relative wage and capital intensity are positively related, which we summarize by the
formal dependence ! = ! (k). A change in relative wage has two opposite e¤ects on the labor share:
! (@LS=@!)
LS
= (1  LS)

1  ! (dk=d!)
k

: (4)
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Result 2 Classical view of the labor share
Let " = !(@k=@!)=k be the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. The labor share
strictly decreases with relative wage if and only if the elasticity of substitution is larger than one,
that is @LS=@! < 0 is equivalent to " > 1.
Firms substitute capital to labor when the relative wage increases. The magnitude of this substitution
is captured by the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. Following the classical view, the
labor share should not depend on the relative factor cost when aggregate output is Cobb-Douglas.
Result 3 Labor market view of the labor share
Let K be given and  = ! (@L=@!) =L be the elasticity of the labor demand with respect to relative
wage. The labor share strictly decreases with relative wage if and only if the elasticity of the labor
demand is lower than  1, that is @LS=@! < 0 is equivalent to  <  1.
When capital does not adjust, the relative factor cost alters capital intensity through its impact on
employment:
dk
d!
=  K
L2
dL
d!
: (5)
Hence, we can rewrite the elasticity of substitution
!dk=d!
k
=  !dL=d!
L
: (6)
The labor market view states that the labor share decreases with relative wage when the labor demand
is su¢ ciently responsive to changes in relative factor cost.
Globalization in the context of relative factor price rigidity a¤ects capital intensity, the aggregate
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, and the elasticity of the labor demand with respect
to relative factor price.
3.2 HOS model with relative wage rigidity
Davis (1998) examines the impacts of wage rigidities in the HOS framework. We now briey recall the
Davis model. The general assumptions of the model are very standard. There are two sets of countries
denoted by i = 1; 1, and two nal goods produced from capital K and labor L. Technologies have
constant-returns to scale in each sector, and they are the same in both countries up to Total Factor
Productivity. The relative price of the capital-intensive good is p. Preferences over the two goods are
the same across countries, while factor endowments di¤er between countries. Country 1 is endowed with
(K1; N1), while country -1 is endowed with (K 1; N 1). Capital is relatively more abundant in country
1 than in country  1, so that K1=N1 > K 1=N 1. The relative supply of capital at the world level is
ks = (K1 +K 1)= (N1 + N 1). There is perfect competition in the good market. The labor market is
perfectly competitive in country  1, while factor prices are not exible in country 1. Davis considers an
absolute wage rigidity. We slightly alter his reasoning and focus on a relative wage rigidity. Hereafter,
the relative wage ! = w=r is xed. This choice is made for exposition clarity.
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Fig.2: Davis (1998) model with wage rigidity. The model is composed of three relationships: 
the Stolper-Samuelson curve (SS), the Heckscher-Ohlin curve (HO), and the Brecher curve 
(BR). 
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The Davis model contains three endogenous variables: world relative price p, e¤ective capital intensity
k, and employment L1 in country 1. These three variables solve
p = p(k); (HO)
! = !(p); (SS)
L1 =
K
k
 N 1; (BR)
with p0() < 0, !0() < 0, !  !(p(ks)), and k = (K1 +K 1)=(L1 +N 1)  ks.
The rst relationship is the Heckscher-Ohlin curve (HO). Following the Rybczinski theorem, an in-
crease in capital intensity raises the relative supply of the capital-intensive good, thereby lowering the
relative price of that good. Evidently, the relationship goes both ways, a feature that the model with
wage rigidity extensively uses. The second relationship is the Stolper-Samuelson curve (SS). The relative
price is the same in the whole integrated economy. When such a price increases, rms adjust the relative
demand for capital as a result and the relative wage goes down. Owing to the Factor Price Equalization
theorem, the adjustment is the same in both countries. Here again, the relationship goes both ways and
an increase in relative wage translates into a decrease in the relative price of the capital-intensive good.
The third curve is a variant of the Brecher (1974) curve. Following an increase in the relative demand
for capital, employment must fall in the integrated economy. As wages are perfectly exible in country
 1, such a fall in employment can only take place in country 1.
Figure 2 depicts the working of the model.
The model with perfectly competitive factor markets starts from the right with the relative supply
of capital, and ends up left with the relative wage. The model with wage rigidity works the other way
around. Starting from country 1 relative wage !0, the (SS) curve gives the relative price of the capital-
intensive good as a result. This relative price must hold at the integrated level. Factor price equalization
results and !0 prevails for the whole trade area. The corresponding relative price is not compatible
with full employment. At such a price, the (HO) curve implies that the relative demand for the capital-
intensive good is larger than the relative supply with full employment. Consequently, the relative demand
for capital is larger than the relative supply ks. Finally, the (BR) curve gives resulting employment in
country 1.
What happens when the relative wage rigidity increases, or when globalization expands to less-
developed trade partners? An increase in ! lowers the relative price of the capital-intensive good, thereby
further increasing the relative demand for capital. Employment in country 1 decreases as a result, leav-
ing unchanged employment in country  1. Alternatively, opening to trade with less-advanced economies
means that K 1 increases by less than N 1. The relative supply of capital falls as a result. The (BR)
curve moves rightward, which further deteriorates employment in country 1. Result 4 summarizes these
predictions of the Davis model.
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Result 4 The Davis (1998) predictions
Let d! dene a marginal increase in relative wage rigidity and let (dK 1; dN 1) > 0 dene a
marginal increase in globalization. The following statements hold:
(i) a marginal increase in relative wage rigidity raises the relative demand for capital and lowers
employment in country 1 that is, dk=d! > 0 and dL1=d! < 0;
(ii) a marginal increase in globalization increases capital intensity and reduces employment in coun-
try 1 if and only if the relative supply of capital decreases at the world level that is, dk1 < 0 and
dN 1 < 0 if and only if dK 1=dN 1 < k.
We now turn to labor share predictions.
3.3 Labor share and globalization
Suppose that there is a marginal increase in globalization that is, (dK 1; dN 1) > 0 in the particular
context where ! is xed. Such a change in factor endowment alters the relative supply of capital at the
world level, thereby changing the relative demand for capital and employment in country 1. The labor
share in country 1 is LS1 = !=(! + k1). It responds to the marginal change in globalization as follows:
dLS1 =
@LS1
@k1
<0

@k1
@N 1
dN 1 +
@k1
@K 1
dK 1

: (7)
The marginal change in capital intensity is
@k1
@N 1
=
 K1
(L1)
2
@L1
@N 1
: (8)
Using the Brecher relationship (BR), we obtain
@k1
@N 1
=
K1
(L1)
2 > 0: (9)
Similarly, @k1=@K 1 =  K1=(L21)(1=k) < 0. Therefore, we have
dLS1 =
@LS1
@k1
K1
(L1)
2

dN 1   dK 1
k

: (10)
Proposition 1 Labor share and trade globalization
At given ! a marginal increase in globalization negatively a¤ects the labor share in country 1 if and
only if it increases the relative supply of capital that is, dLS1 < 0 if and only if dK 1=dN 1 < k.
Proposition 1 can be understood in light of Result 1. As labor-abundant economies enter the set
of country  1, the relative supply of capital goes down, which further requires capital intensity to be
increased in country 1. Accordingly, Result 1 implies that at given !, an increase in the relative demand
for capital leads to a decrease in the labor share of income.
Proposition 1 also states that trade causes a negative correlation between unemployment and the
labor share in countries that implement relative wage rigidities. By contrast, the correlation should not
exist in countries where the labor market is perfectly competitive.
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3.4 Labor share and relative wage rigidity
Changes in relative factor cost a¤ect the labor share according to the values of the elasticity of substitution
and elasticity of the labor demand. However, trade a¤ects such elasticities, and, therefore, alters the
e¤ects of wage rigidities. The aggregate elasticity of the labor demand is
!@L1=@!
L1
=
!
L1
 K
k2
dk
d!

: (11)
Using the Brecher relationship (BR), we can decompose (11) in two terms
!@L1=@!
L1
= O(K;N 1; k)

 !@k=@!
k

; (12)
where O(K;N 1; k) = K=(K  N 1k). The aggregate elasticity of the labor demand is generally larger
than the world aggregate elasticity of substitution. The factor proportion O depends on the extent of
globalization. It is larger than one, except for the autarkic case where N 1 = 0. Globalization increases
the elasticity of labor demand with respect to autarky.
Proposition 2 Labor share and relative wage rigidity
A marginal increase in relative wage rigidity implies a fall in the labor share if and only if the elasticity
of substitution at the world level is lower than O (K;N 1; k)
 1 that is, @LS1=d! < 0 if and only if
(!dk=d!)=k  1=O(K;N 1; k) = (K  N 1k)=K.
In a globalized world, wage rigidities are more likely to reduce the labor share than in a closed
economy. Globalization increases the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor at the country
level. Indeed, a marginal increase in globalization modies the openness term O in equation (12):
dO = (O   1) (dN 1=N 1   dK 1) : (13)
The change in openness dO has the sign of dN 1=N 1   dK 1.
We solve the model with Cobb-Douglas technologies and a log-linear utility function. Per capita
output in sector i = a; b is f(ki) = Aik
i
i , with 1 > a > b > 0. The utility function is U(c1; c2) =
 ln c1 +  ln c2. We can write the HO and SS relationships as follows:
p(k) =
Bb
Ba

(1  a) + (1  b)
a + b
b a
kb a ; (14)
!(p) =

Ba
Bb
p
1=(b a)
; (15)
where Bi = (1  i)(i=(1  i))iAi. Hence, we have
!(k) =
(1  a) + (1  b)
a + b
k: (16)
Consequently, k!0(k)=! = 1. Therefore, dLS=d! < 0 whenever N 1 > 0. In autarky, factor accumulation
and relative wage rigidity do no impact the aggregate labor share of income. Aggregate elasticity of
substitution is equal to one. In the open-economy case, factor O becomes larger than one and the
aggregate elasticity of substitution (of the labor demand) is larger than one (lower than minus one). The
labor share, therefore, decreases with the relative wage rigidity.
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3.5 Sector-specic vs aggregate labor share
Globalization and wage rigidities alter the aggregate labor share of income. Aggregate changes reect
changes within and between sectors. Formally, the aggregate labor share can be decomposed as follows:
LS1 = aLSa + (1  a)LSb; (17)
with a = paYa=(paYa+ pbYb) the share of the capital intensive good in total value-added. As p = pa=pb,
and denoting y = Ya=Yb relative output, we have a = py= (py + 1).
Consider a marginal increase in relative wage !. We have
dLS1
d!
=
da
d!
(LSa   LSb)| {z }
sector reallocation
+ a
dLSa
d!
+ (1  a)
dLSb
d!| {z }
within-sector e¤ects
: (18)
The global e¤ect results from a composition e¤ect and within-sector e¤ects. We start with the composition
e¤ect. The relative wage rigidity increases the relative demand for capital k1. The Rybczinski theorem
implies factor reallocation towards the capital-intensive sector. It follows that dy=d! > 0. However, the
increase in ! also causes a price e¤ect, namely a decline in the relative price p of the capital-intensive good.
The relative strength of the two e¤ects depends on preferences, technologies, and trade openness. In a
globalized world, the Rybczinski e¤ect is stronger than in autarky, and the share of the capital-intensive
sector is more likely to increase.
Now consider sector-specic e¤ects. Result 2 predicts the signs of such e¤ects:
dLSi
d!
< 0 if and only if
!dki=d!
ki
> 1: (19)
In the case of Cobb-Douglas technologies, the elasticity ! (dki=d!) =ki = 1. This implies dLSi=d! = 0.
Changes in aggregate labor share then reect sector share changes. When preferences are log-linear, the
Rybczinski e¤ect exactly o¤sets the price e¤ect in autarky, and overcrowds it when the country is open
to trade. The labor share, therefore, stays constant under autarky and decreases otherwise.
Using the same rationale we can decompose the impact of globalization. Consider for instance a
marginal increase in N 1. We have
dLS1
dN 1
=
da
dN 1
(LSa   LSb)| {z }
sector reallocation (<0)
+ a
dLSa
dN 1
+ (1  a)
dLSb
dN 1| {z }
within-sector e¤ects (=0)
: (20)
We know the overall impact, namely dLS1=dN 1 < 0. In addition, sector-specic labor shares must stay
constant, that is dLSi=dN 1 = 0, i = a; b. Indeed, ! and p stay constant. Sector-specic capital intensity
does not change, which implies that LSa and LSb do not vary. The overall change in aggregate labor
share is entirely driven by the pace of factor reallocation between sectors. Owing to the relative factor
price rigidity, the relative price p of the capital-intensive good stays constant. The Rybczinski e¤ect then
implies that the capital-intensive sector share a increases.
3.6 Explaining LS changes
The model can predict the set of facts presented in Section 2, namely constant and uncorrelated with
unemployment labor shares in Anglo-Saxon countries, decreasing and correlated with unemployment
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shares in Continental Europe, broadly constant shares at sector/rm level.
Time t goes from 1970 to 2000. There are three sets of countries, two equally developed (Continental
Europe E, and Anglo-Saxon countries US) and one set of developing countries (D). Europe is country 1,
while Anglo-Saxon and developing countries belong to country  1. The set of factor endowments at date t
is f(KE;t; NE;t),(KUS;t; NUS;t),(KD;t; ND;t)g. The world relative supply of capital is kst =
P
Ki;t=
P
Ni;t.
The relative supply of capital is initially the same in Europe and in the US. It also stays xed over time,
so that KE;t = ksENE;t and KUS;t = k
s
ENUS;t for all t. Developing countries gradually open to trade.
Therefore KD;t and ND;t increase over time.
The relative wage rigidity !t takes place in Europe. It stays xed over time. As a benchmark, the
initial value ensures that full employment holds in Europe in 1970, so that !t = !(ksE).
The model is
!t = !(p (kt)); (21)
LE;t =
Kt
kt
  (NUS;t +ND;t); (22)
LSi;t =
!t
!t + ki;t
; (23)
with kD;t = KD;t=ND;t , kUS;t = KUS;t=NUS;t, and kE;t = KE;t=LE;t.
Figure 3 depicts the patterns of LSUS , LSE , and LSD.
We start with the US labor share. As !t remains xed at the 1970 competitive level and the US
relative supply of capital does not change over time, US employment adopts the pattern of the labor
supply NUS;t. Meanwhile, the US labor share remains constant from 1970 to 2000. Employment and the
labor share have independent patterns. Put di¤erently, they should not be correlated.
In Continental European countries, employment and the labor share jointly move. The rigid relative
factor price !t does not correspond to the competitive one after the inclusion of new traders. That
is !t = !(kt) 6= !(kst ). The impacts on European employment and labor share are given by Result 4
and Proposition 1. They both decrease from one year to the other whenever KD;t=ND;t < kt, stay
constant when KD;t=ND;t = kt, and increase when KD;t=ND;t > kt. European employment and
labor share should be positively correlated.
The fall in European share observed in the 1980s and 1990s can be predicted assuming thatKD;t=ND;t <
k for t = 1970; :::; 2000. As new countries open to trade, the relative supply of capital decreases over a
decade. The stagnation of the share observed in the mid-1990s means that the relative supply of capital
stays constant from 1990 to 2000. This is possible if older entrants in world trade accumulate physical
capital at a rate that compensates the entry of newer and more labor-abundant countries.
The fall in European aggregate labor shares is associated with factor reallocation towards capital-
intensive sectors. By contrast, no factor reallocation takes place in Anglo-Saxon countries. The pattern
of aggregate labor shares strongly contrast with micro (sector-specic) patterns. In so far as the relative
factor cost stay xed, sector-specic shares do not change at industry/rm level. This prediction distin-
guishes the HOS model with wage rigidity from the Rodrik-type models discussed in the introduction.
In such models, the labor share goes down because globalization boosts the outside options of capital
owners, pushing wages down at given output. This mechanism should take place at rm level, which
14
 
Fig.3 : Trade and aggregate labor shares. DC gradually open to trade and relative wage stays 
constant. 
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contradicts the micro evidence.
In developing countries, employment is determined by the labor supply ND;t. Globalization a¤ects
the labor share through two distinct mechanisms, depending on whether we consider the country at world
trade entry or after entry.
At entry, say in t (so the country is closed in t  1), the variation in the labor share is
LSD;t =
!
! + ksD;t
  !(k
s
D;t 1)
!(ksD;t 1) + k
s
D;t 1
> 0: (24)
The labor share increases at world trade entry. It is consistent with labor share patterns observed in
some Newly Industrialized Countries and East Asian countries.
After entry, the labor share is larger than in Europe and the US. The year-to-year change LSD;t
has the sign of  ksD;t. As long as those countries accumulate physical capital over time, the labor share
must go down. This explanation to the decrease in the labor share of developing countries hinges on the
fact that the corresponding countries belong to the diversication cone of the developed economies (see
Schott, 2003).
The model can predict the set of facts we are interested in. However, it also predicts that the labor
share should be larger in developing than in developed countries. This contradicts the empirical evidence
according to which the labor share increases along with development.4 This prediction is closely associated
with the working of the HOS model. It follows Result 1, whereby the labor share decreases with capital
intensity within a given trade area.
4 Empirical evidence
This section confronts the model predictions to sectorial data. We want to assess whether trade with
developing countries specically increased the pace of factor reallocation towards capital-intensive sectors
in Continental Europe, and whether such an increase leads to signicant changes in the labor share. We
rst present our dataset, and then turn to xed e¤ects regressions.
4.1 Dataset
The KLEMS dataset provides sectorial data for 8 OECD countries over the period 1970-2005. We use this
dataset to compute labor shares and sector shares at sector level. The COMTRADE dataset provides
country-specic data on trade intensity with China. We use this variable as a proxy for trade with
developing countries.
The KLEMS dataset covers 28 sectors. In each sector, there are data on wages, employment, output,
and capital stock. Sector-specic and aggregate labor shares are computed as the ratio of total wage bill
to value-added. The ratio is corrected from self-employment. Namely, we attribute the mean wage of
employees to self-employed workers.
4Using UN aggregate data, Gollin (2001) argues that the labor share does not change with GDP per capita. However,
he in no way claims that it decreases with development.
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We build two super-sectors from the 28 sectors. A sector is capital-intensive if capital intensity is
larger than the aggregate capital to labor ratio in 2000. For robustness purposes, we isolate tradable
sectors and proceed similarly. The tradable sectors are "Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing",
"Mining and Quarrying", and "Total manufacturing".
We compute the share of the capital-intensive (super-)sector in total value-added. Let i 2 f1; :::; 28g
denote the sector index, k 2 f1; :::; 8g be the country index, and t 2 f1970; :::; 2005g be the time index.
Let also T = fi 2 f1; :::; 28g, i is tradableg denote the subset of tradable sectors. For all t, we have
SS1t =
X
i=1;:::;28
1ikPiktYikt=PktYkt with 1ik =
(
1 if (K=L)ik1970 > (K=L)k1970
0 else
; (25)
SS2t =
X
i2T
1ikPiktYikt=P
T
ktY
T
kt with 1ik =
(
1 if (K=L)ik1970 > (K=L)Tk1970
0 else
; (26)
where PktYkt =
P
i PiktYikt, (K=L)k1970 = (
P
iKik1970)=
P
i Lik1970, and the upperscript T denotes that
the variable is computed within the set of tradable sectors.
Mean value Mean LS
SS1 34% 58
1-SS1 66 78
SS2 48 47
1-SS2 52 80
Table 3: Super-sector shares and labor shares
Table 3 presents the results. In line with Result 1, the labor share within the capital-intensive super-
sector is 58%, against 78% for the labor-intensive super-sector. The di¤erence is even stronger when we
only focus on tradable sectors. In the Appendix, we show that this result holds at a more disaggregate
level. If we restrict the analysis to tradable sectors only, the di¤erence is even greater, as the labor share
goes from 47% to 80%. Factor reallocation between sectors, therefore, can a¤ect the aggregate labor
share.
We need a trade variable that varies across countries, and that reects trade with developing countries
rather than trade in general. We follow Michaels et al (2009) and consider the ratio of Chinese exports
plus imports to GDP. This variable must be viewed as a proxy for overall trade with developing countries.
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Fig.4: Trade with China in Continental Europe and in the US-UK, 1970-2005. Continental Europe:
Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain.
Figure 4 shows that trade with China massively increased from 1970 to 2005, starting from 0 and reaching
1.5% on average for the two sets of countries by the end of the period. The rise in trade is a homogenous
phenomenon in our sample of countries. Variance decomposition shows that most of trade volatility is
actually driven by the time dimension rather than by cross-country heterogeneity. Indeed, the standard
deviation is roughly equal to the trade mean, which approximately corresponds to the within deviation,
and represents 3 times the between deviation.
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the variables we use in sub-section 4.2.
Mean Stand. dev. min max obs
SS1 0.34 0.06 0.20 0.46 281
SS2 0.48 0.07 0.30 0.66 281
Trade 0.0043 0.0048 0 0.0331 271
K/Y 0.61 0.55 0.29 3.44 281
(K/Y)T 0.54 0.43 0.18 3.05 281
Table 4: Descriptive statistics
Theory predicts that labor shares decrease in rigid-wage countries where strong factor reallocation
towards capital-intensive sectors take place. By contrast, factor reallocation should be much weaker in
free-wage countries. The panel of Figures 5 reveals four facts. For each year, we compute the mean share
of the capital-intensive sector in civil-law and common-law countries. We confront it to the mean value
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Fig. 5a: Share of the capital-intensive sector in aggregate output and 
trade openness with China in civil-law countries. 
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Fig. 5b: Share of the capital-intensive sector in aggregate output and 
trade openness with China in common-law countries 
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Fig. 5c: Share of the capital-intensive sector in tradable output and 
trade openness with China in civil-law countries 
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Fig. 5d: Share of the capital-intensive sector in tradable output and 
trade openness with China in common-law countries 
 
 
 
of the trade ratio with China within each group of countries. The share of the capital-intensive sector
substantially increased in civil-law countries. From 1970 to 2005, the share goes from 29% to 35%, a
6-point increase. If we restrict the analysis to tradable sectors only, the increase has a similar magnitude.
The share of the capital-intensive super-sector decreased in common-law countries (if we focus on the
whole economy), or did not show any trend (if we only focus on tradable sectors).
The magnitude of factor reallocation in civil-law countries is potentially promising to explain changes
in aggregate labor share. For instance, SS1 experiences a 6-point increase in civil-law countries and a
5-point decrease in common-law countries. The di¤erential change amounts to 11 points. The mean
labor share is 58% in the capital-intensive sector, while it is 78% in the labor-intensive sector. Factor
reallocation between sectors, therefore, can lead to a di¤erential change in labor share that amounts to
11*(0.78-0.58)=2.2 points. Section 2 shows that the observed di¤erential change is about 3.5 points.
Factor reallocation between sectors, therefore, can explain up to 60% of the observed di¤erential change
between the two sets of countries.
Of course, part of this change has nothing to do with trade. The purpose of the next sub-section is to
measure the proportion of this change that can be directly attributed to trade with developing countries.
4.2 Fixed-e¤ects regressions
We proceed to the following xed e¤ects regressions:
SSit = 1Tradeit  EUi + 2Tradeit + 3 (K=Y )it + i + t + it; (27)
where EU is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if civil law is the legal origin of the country and
0 otherwise. We regress the share of the capital-intensive super-sector on trade and its interaction with
the dummy EU. The statistical model allows us to test whether trade with China has a distinctive and
signicantly positive e¤ect on the weight of the capital-intensive sector in civil-law countries. Theory,
therefore, predicts that parameter 1 is positive.
In addition to Trade variables, we add a control for capital intensity at the aggregate level. At given
relative factor price, the Rybczinski theorem predicts that capital intensity should increase the weight of
the capital-intensive sector. We do not consider the ratio of capital to labor. The theoretically relevant
ratio is actually the ratio of capital to e¢ cient units of labor. Its computation requires labor-augmenting
technological change to be correctly dened. We abstract from such a computation by considering the
ratio of capital to output.
Finally, we add country xed e¤ects and time dummies. Country xed e¤ects control for time-invariant
unobserved characteristics that are correlated with trade and the weight of the capital-intensive sector.
Time dummies account for shocks that a¤ect all countries simultaneously and may be correlated with
trade as a result. For instance, changes in relative wage rigidities in Continental European countries
increase the weight of capital-intensive sectors in all developed countries. Changes in factor endowments
in developing countries have similar e¤ects. Capital accumulation in China should reduce the share of
capital-intensive sectors in developed countries.
Endogeneity bias must be taken into account. There are two sources of potential biases. On the one
hand, the share of the capital-intensive sectors may cause trade with China. Capital-intensive industries
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may require inputs especially produced in developing countries. On the other hand, there may be an
omitted variable that causes both trade and the growth of capital-intensive industries. Both sources
of bias are not very convincing as trade grew both in civil-law and common-law countries, while the
capital-intensive super-sector increased in the former and decreased in the latter. Why would reverse
causality bias only a¤ect the US and the UK? Why would an X factor creating an articial correlation
between trade and sector share work di¤erently for civil and common-law countries? However, we choose
to address the problem by means of an explicit IV strategy.
We need an instrument that is highly correlated with the trade variables, but uncorrelated with sector
shares in developed countries. The Fraser Institute provides various institutional variables for developing
countries over a long time range. Institutions in developing countries are not necessarily correlated with
sector shares in developed countries, and could well be correlated with trade development with China. All
the variables take values between 0 (highly regulated) and 10 (no regulation). The list is the following:
"Economic Freedom", "Size of Government", "Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights", "Access
to Sound Money", "Freedom to Trade Internationally", and "Regulation of Credit, Labor and Business".
These variables are dened over 5-year periods, from 1980 to 2005 for most, and for 1970-2005 for "Access
to Sound Money" and "Regulation of Credit, Labor and Business". We complete the variables by linear
interpolation.
A rst regression, not reported here, shows that all these variables are strongly correlated with Trade
and Trade*EU, except for "Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights". However, only the variable
"Access to Sound Money" (ASM) seems exogenous to the share of the capital-intensive super-sector.5 The
correlation of this variable with trade is due to the fact that people involved in international trade need
to convert foreign money, and to have banking accounts in foreign countries to pay, to receive payments,
and borrow money (see Berman and Héricourt, 2010). The variable is available since 1970.
The other instruments are more usual. We consider trade and trade*EU lagged 10 years. Such trade
ows are not related to the share of the capital-intensive sector ten years later. In addition, they have
been available since 1960. However, reported trade ows were 0 during part of the 1960s when China
was closed to international trade. We omit these observations whether we exclude or include them
marginally a¤ects the results.
First-stage regressions are the following:
Tradeit = 1ASMt + 2ASMt  EUi
+3Tradeit 10 + 4Tradeit 10  EUi + 5[included] + it; (28)
Trade  EUit = 1ASMt + 2ASMt  EUi
+3Tradeit 10 + 4Tradeit 10  EUi + 5[included] + it; (29)
The excluded instruments are ASMt, ASMt  EUi, Tradeit 10, and Tradeit 10  EUi. The included
instruments are all the regressors but trade variables: country xed e¤ects, time e¤ects and aggregate
5The index ranges from 0-10 where 0 corresponds to high annual money growth, high variation in the annual rate of
ination, high ination rate, and restricted foreign currency bank accounts and 10 corresponds to low annual money
growth, low or no variation in the annual rate of ination, low ination rate, and foreign currency bank accounts are
permissible without restrictions.
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capital to output ratio.
Table 5 displays the results. We only report the coe¢ cients associated with the excluded instruments.
Trade TradeEU
Tradet 10 1:35
0:23
 0:49
0:28
Tradet 10EU  0:24
0:51
1:99
0:53
ASM :001
:000
:000
:000
ASMEU :002
:000
:003
:000
No obs 254 254
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
The Table only reports parameters associated with excluded instruments.
Table 5: First-stage regression results
Excluded instruments are strongly signicant. The sign of the various parameters is economically
relevant: lagged trade has a positive impact on current trade, and Access to sound money as well. Note,
however, that overall trade seems better correlated with ASM than with ASMEU. In addition, Shea
partial R2 is 25% for the rst regression, and 75% for the second one.
Table 6 reports the estimates. The rst two columns report OLS estimates when the dependent
variable is, respectively, SS1 and SS2. The next two columns report 2SLS results. We do not present
two-step GMM estimates, as they marginally di¤er from 2SLS results. Squared errors are corrected by
the Eicker-Huber-White method.
OLS SS1 OLS SS2 IV SS1 IV SS2
Trade*EU 7:44
(1:41)
3:12
(1:20)
4:22
(1:36)
2:65
(1:31)
Trade  6:18
(1:83)
 :79
(1:71)
5:59
(3:91)
:31
(3:48)
K/Y  :001
(:03)
:01
(:01)
 :03
(:01)
:001
(:011)
No obs 264 264 243 243
Hansen over-identication test . . 0.77 0.24
within-R2 0.41 0.52 . .
within-R2 (/ time dummies) 0.35 0.39 . .
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Robust standard errors
between brackets. The dependent variable is the capital-intensive super-sector share.
All regressions feature country and time dummies. The Hansen line reports the p-value
of the Hansen test.
Table 6: Fixed e¤ects regressions
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The results for trade are in line with theory. Trade has no signicant impact on sector share in
common-law countries. By contrast, it has a strong positive e¤ect in civil-law countries. The e¤ect is
typically lower when we focus on the tradable sector only. However, the labor share di¤erential between
the capital- and labor-intensive super-sectors is larger in this latter case.
Accounting for endogeneity bias substantially reduces the e¤ects of trade. The parameter associated
with trade*EU is divided by two for the SS1 variable, while the reduction is smaller for the SS2 variable.
As discussed below, this result was expected. The development of the capital-intensive sector requires
inputs that are produced in China.
Factor endowments do not a¤ect the share of capital-intensive sectors. The e¤ect of K/Y is even
negative when the dependent variable is SS1. This result is at odds with the Rybczinski theorem. A
possible explanation relies on the fact that country-specic factor endowments must be compared to the
factor endowments in the rest of the world, and especially in developing countries. As we do not measure
such endowments, country-specic factor endowments alone do not necessarily alter sector shares.
4.3 Discussions
Using our estimates, we can quantify the impact of trade with China on the capital-intensive sector share,
and then on aggregate labor share. The rise in trade is roughly similar across countries. It increases by
about 1.5 percentage points. The rst line of Table 6 allows us to quantify the di¤erential impact on
Continental European capital-intensive sector shares. According to the OLS estimate, this impact is
about 7.44*1.511 percentage points. This broadly corresponds to the observed di¤erential change in
capital-intensive sector share between Continental Europe and Anglo-Saxon countries. The OLS estimate,
therefore, attributes the whole di¤erential change to trade with developing countries. According to the
IV estimate, this impact is about 4.22*1.5%6.5 percentage points. The predicted impact is reduced by
40%, which seems more reasonable given the fact that part of trade with China is actually caused by
the capital-intensive sector share. Given the mean labor share di¤erential between the capital-intensive
and the labor-intensive super-sector, the OLS estimate predicts that Continental European shares are
reduced by 11*(0.78-0.58) 2.2 points compared with Anglo-Saxon countries. The IV estimate predicts
a more modest and more realistic decline by 6.5*(0.78-0.58) 1.3 points.
Overall, the predicted di¤erential labor share change between Continental Europe and the US-UK is
not far from the observed one. For instance, our preferred estimate, the IV estimate, predicts a 1.3-point
di¤erence, which is about 40% of the observed di¤erence. We now comment this result.
On the one hand, our study provides a lower bound to the magnitude of trade e¤ects on factor
reallocation. Sectorial data do not allow us to capture the whole phenomenon of factor reallocation
predicted by trade theories based on factor endowment heterogeneity. Schott (2003, 2004) for instance
shows that factor intensities vary considerably within a sector. In addition, within-product specialization
alters our ability to distinguish capital-intensive sectors from labor-intensive sectors. To quote Schott:
"[The] evidence suggests that conventional tests of trade theory using industry level data are problematic
because much of the endowment-driven specialization occurs at a level that was, until recently, hidden
from the researcher."
In terms of the Davis model with wage rigidity, the question is whether factor reallocation towards
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capital-intensive high-quality goods especially occurred in Continental Europe. This may explain why
output per worker in the industrialized sector is so much higher in Continental Europe than in the UK.
Böckerman and Maliranta (2009) provide evidence of this phenomenon for Finland. They work at plant
level and show that most of the fall in labor share observed there corresponds to composition e¤ects
taking place at plant level.
On the other hand, our study cannot exclude that di¤erential time-varying e¤ects took place between
Continental Europe and Anglo-Saxon countries. For instance, the e¤ects of trade with China vanish when
we introduce time dummies or trends that di¤er between civil and common-law countries. This result is
not very surprising given the homogeneity of the trade pattern in our sample of countries. Nevertheless,
we cannot reject the thesis whereby other factors, correlated with trade, take place and explain sector
share changes in developed countries. From this perspective, our study provides an upper-bound to the
magnitude of trade e¤ects, because we attribute the whole e¤ect of such trends to trade. However, the
puzzle would remain: what could be such di¤erential e¤ects?
5 Conclusion
This paper questions the ability of the HOS model to reproduce the patterns of labor shares in two sets
of countries. Namely, labor shares stay constant in Anglo-Saxon countries, and go down in continental
European countries. In addition, the labor share does not change much at sector or rm level. We show
that once completed with a relative wage rigidity in Europe, the model can predict such facts. The key
mechanism at work relies on the fact that trade globalization with developing or newly industrialized
countries increases European unemployment. Factors are reallocated towards low labor-share sectors in
Europe, which decreases the aggregate labor share.
The model predictions are broadly conrmed by the empirical evidence at sector-level data. We
use the KLEMS dataset for 8 OECD countries over the period 1970-2006. We build a super capital-
intensive sector in each country. The share of this sector in overall GDP increased with trade with
China in Continental European countries compared with Anglo-Saxon countries. Put otherwise, the
fall in European labor shares is partly due to trade-induced factor reallocation towards capital-intensive
industries. Fixed e¤ects estimates imply that the pattern of trade with China between the 1970s and the
2000s predicts a di¤erential labor share change between Continental Europe and Anglo-Saxon countries
that is comprised between 1 point (OLS estimates) and 2 points (IV estimates).
Still, the model remains puzzling in one respect. It generically predicts that the labor share decreases
with capital intensity within a trade area. It implies, therefore, that the labor share is larger in developing
than in developed countries. This fact, together with the more usual Leontief critique, calls for renement.
In future work, we plan to revisit the model predictions when there are skilled and unskilled workers, and
skilled workers are complementary to physical capital.
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Fig. A1: Labor shares over time
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 List of sectors: Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing; Mining and Quarrying; Food products,
Beverages and Tobacco; Textiles, Textile Products, Leather and Footwear; Wood and Products of
Wood and Cork; Pulp, Paper, Paper products, Printing and Publishing; Coke, Rened Petroleum
Products and Nuclear Fuel; Chemicals and Chemical Products; Rubber and plastics products;
Other Non-Metallic mineral products; Basic Metals and Fabricated metal products; Machinery,
nec; Electrical and Optical equipment; Transport equipment; Manufacturing nec, recycling; Elec-
tricity Gas and Water supply; Construction; Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and
motorcycles, retail sale of; Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and
motorcycles; Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of household goods;
Hotel and Restaurants; Transport and Storage; Post and Telecommunications; Financial interme-
diation; Real estate activities; Renting of machinery and equipment and other business activities;
Community social and personal services.
 List of tradable sectors: Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing; Mining and Quarrying; Food
products, Beverages and Tobacco; Textiles, Textile Products, Leather and Footwear; Wood and
Products of Wood and Cork; Pulp, Paper, Paper products, Printing and Publishing; Coke, Rened
Petroleum Products and Nuclear Fuel; Chemicals and Chemical Products; Rubber and plastics
products; Other Non-Metallic mineral products; Basic Metals and Fabricated metal products; Ma-
chinery, nec; Electrical and Optical equipment; Transport equipment; Manufacturing nec, recycling
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Figure A2 and the panel of Figures A3 show that the labor share decreases with capital intensity
at sector level. All Figures use data from the 28 sectors of the dataset in 2000. Figure A2 pools the 8
countries, while the panel of Figure A3 separately considers each country.
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Fig.A2: Labor share and capital intensity at sector level in 2000. K/L is the capital
labor ratio, while LS is the ratio of wage bill to value-added corrected for
self-employment. There are 28 sectors and 8 countries. Source: KLEMS dataset and
authorscomputations.
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Panel of Figures A3: Labor shares and capital intensity at sector level, country-specic patterns, 2000
28
